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Introduction
The defense industry in the United States represents a unique case due to its
sheer size; its largest customer, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and
the non-defense industries engaged in defense related work. In 2017, with
global defense expenditures estimated at $1.7 trillion, U.S. defense expend-
itures, at around $610 billion, accounted for approximately 36 percent of
total global defense expenditures (SIPRI 2018a).
According to the Defense News Top 100 list for 2018, which ranks companies by
defense revenue,1 five and 39 of the top ten and top 100, respectively are U.S.
companies (Defense News Top 100 List 2018). In addition, the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Industry Database breaks out BAE
Systems Inc. as a U.S. company subsidiary of BAE Systems U.K. and lists it in the
top 10 in addition to six other U.S. companies.2 In fact, the U.S. subsidiary to BAE
Systems generates over 40 percent of its revenue (SIPRI 2018b). Among the top
10 companies, U.S. firms account for 69 percent of that group’s defense revenue
(Aitoro 2018).
The U.S. defense industry exported about $75.9 billion in 2017 (Mehta
2017). The United States spent $79.2 billion on research and development
(R&D), and $124 billion on procurement—more than twice the amount that
Google, Microsoft, and Apple spent on R&D and procurement combined.
Worldwide spending for the same year was at $116 billion for defense R&D
and $310 billion for procurement (Jane’s IHS 2018a). The U.S. DoD sources
the majority of its spending domestically due to the U.S. defense industry’s
high competency and the Buy America Act (procurement preference to
domestic products with a punitive evaluation factor applied to most foreign
products). In a 2007 report, DoD estimated that it awarded less than 0.5 per-
cent of all contracts and about 1.5 percent of contracts for defense items and
components to foreign contractors (DoD 2008).
The major exception is BAE Systems, a British firm that views the U.S. as
one of its primary markets, and the most promising (BAE 2018, 19). BAE is
a special case for a number of reasons. First, BAE participation in the U.S.
market was facilitated by the longstanding “special relationship”, between the
U.K. and the U.S. This has included close cooperation in defense acquisition
programs, from the atomic bomb to the F-35. Among other things, this trad-
ition of U.S.-U.K. cooperation helped BAE establish trust with DoD. The
recent addition of the U.K. to the U.S. National Technical Industrial Base
(DoD 2018, 11) will likely enhance this relationship
Second, BAE’s strategy included acquisition of Sanders and Tracor, two
key U.S. suppliers of highly classified military equipment.
Third, and related, BAE has a special security agreement with the U.S.
Government; there’s a “firewall” which prevents exchange of highly sensitive
information between executives of the U.S. affiliate (all U.S. citizens) and the
parent corporation in the U.K.
Finally, the statement “it is hard to tell whether BAE Systems should be
flying the Union Jack or waving the Stars and Stripes” has been true for
some time. Among other things, U.S. citizens hold a significant portion of its
shares (Wayne 2006, C1).
Janes’ World Defense Industry lists 271 U.S. companies as significant defense
companies. Interestingly, Jane’s does not list technology leaders such as Apple,
Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft, (first, second, third, and fourth most valuable com-
panies worldwide, respectively), and does not provide data on the defense portion
of their business, making it difficult to determine the size of the market with cer-
tainty (Jane’s HIS 2018b). This lack of information exists despite the U.S. defense
market’s appeal. Jane’s Market Potential Index (MPI) score (a scale from 0 to 5)
assesses the appeal of 93 world defense markets based on a number of factors. The
final market rating for the United States is 4.38, second after Japan’s score of 4.39.
The United States is the only nation ranked at 5 for overall defense investment
and defense industrial capabilities.
The analytical foundation for this Chapter comes from works that explore
the intersection of a game theory-enriched standard microeconomics and the
literature on corporate strategy: e.g., Competitive Strategy (Porter 1980), Co-
opetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996).
Our approach also reflects “contestability” (the inverse of barriers to entry;
Baumol, Panzer and Willig 1988, esp. Chapter 10). Understanding barriers to
entering the U.S. defense marketplace involves, inter alia, some knowledge of
the large, complicated policy and regulatory structure which governs it.
Accordingly, we devote considerable attention to that environment.
Economic environment of the U.S. defense industry
U.S. DoD spending
The U.S. defense industry depends for the most part on U.S. government
expenditures. Figure 2.1 displays defense expenditures from 1980 to 2018, div-
ided roughly into four separate periods: first, the Reagan buildup in the
1980s; second, the post-Cold War decline associated with a “procurement holi-
day;” third, various contingency operations following the World Trade
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Center attacks in 2001; and fourth, the Budget Control Act of 2011. As
the dotted linear line in Figure 2.1 indicates, the data trends upwards over
time. There is no trend, however, if the overseas contingency component
is excluded.
In the post 9/11 era, the Total Obligation Authority (TOA) included allow-
ances for various contingency operations, over and above the “Base” DoD TOA.
The difference between the upper and lower line, the Base TOA, reflects this.
With the ending of the Cold War, U.S. defense budgets began a steady
decline with no foreseeable end in sight at the time. With much new
equipment in hand from the Reagan Buildup, the logical place to cut
spending was in procurement, meaning that lesser defense budgets shown in
Figure 2.2, and reported in Wayne (1998a), would most affect the defense
industrial base.
DoD Procurement outlays have risen in keeping with the Reagan and
“other contingencies” increases, the procurement holiday of the 1990s, the
post-2001 increases (with an interesting spike in 2008 corresponding to
the “surge” in Iraq), and then a downturn in procurement corresponding
to the Budget Control Act of 2011.
Mergers in the defense industrial base
In 1993, Secretary of Defense Aspin and Deputy Secretary Perry con-
cluded that some industrial consolidation was necessary and announced this
to executives from major defense companies at a Pentagon dinner.4 The
main message was that the major defense players needed to consolidate to












































































































Figure 2.1 National defense Total Obligational Authority (TOA) in constant dollars (DoD
Comptroller “Green Book” 2017).
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offering financial incentives and advocating consolidations in the event of
antitrust challenges. The audience was receptive and as Norman Augustine
(Martin Marietta CEO at the time) put it later: “You weren’t going to
survive unless you were willing to combine. So, there was not much of
a choice” (Altoro 2016).
The Administration delivered. It provided strong advocacy for the Boeing-
McDonnell-Douglas merger. It also allowed reorganization expenses as part
of reimbursable costs, which amounted to a significant support, both direct
and indirect, for the process (Gartzke 2010, 114, 116).
A large number of consolidations within the defense industrial base
followed. One source (Tirpak 1998) estimated that 51 companies were
combined into five. Reportedly the financial value of the consolidations
totaled $55 billion (Wayne 1998b). The marquee mergers were Northrop
with Grumman (in April 1994), Lockheed with Martin-Marietta (in
August 1994), and Boeing with McDonnel-Douglas (in December 1996).
The era of very large mergers came to a rather abrupt end in 1998. With
the proposed merger of Lockheed-Martin and Northrop-Grumman, and the
advent of new leadership at the Departments of Justice and Defense,
a consensus emerged that a merger between Lockheed-Martin and Northrop-
Grumman went too far. Wayne (1998b) and Ricks and Cole (1998) provide
excellent contemporaneous reporting of these events.
The authors of this chapter believe that one should view the “Last Supper”
as ratifying, encouraging, and accelerating a long-term trend toward consoli-
dation in defense industries. “Eye charts” showing defense corporations mer-
ging into ever smaller numbers have frequently depicted this phenomenon



































REAL DOD PROCUREMENT OUTLAYS
Figure 2.2 DoD procurement and research, development, technology, and evaluation
(RDT&E) outlays in constant dollars (DoD Comptroller 2018).3
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The 1998 disapproval seems to have ended one era and started another.
The Northrop-Grumman/Lockheed-Martin precedent discouraged mergers
of very large companies. This prevailed for about two decades, during which
time there was plenty of activity, but mostly involving larger companies
acquiring smaller companies.
Recent experience, however, seems to indicate another era of large-scale
consolidations. According to Harris Chairman and Chief Executive Bill
Brown (Mattioli et al 2018b), “There’s definitely a need for greater invest-
ment, which requires scale”.
Despite all the activity, U.S. firms feature prominently in the worldwide
top 10 revenue rankings. Table 2.1 shows snapshots of the rankings for
U.S. firms, which appeared in at least one of the top 10 rankings. Five
appeared in the top 10 for the 2018 rankings and seven in 2009 and in
2000. The Big Five—Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, Northrop-Grumman,
Boeing, and General Dynamics—have been regulars as top 10 defense
firms.
United Technologies has been on the edge. Sometimes barely in the group
and sometimes just out. General Electric, which ranked fifth in the 2000 list,
has been absent in the other top 10 snapshots. It is, however, still a major
defense producer and ranked 22nd in 2018. L3 Communications moved into
the top 10 in 2009 but, in 2018, it moved back to 12th primarily due the
sale of a division in 2017. Overall, the relative positions of the U.S. Big Five
have remained fairly stable in recent decades as they adapt to market changes
and remain industry leaders.
Table 2.2 shows a representative number of recent (as of 2018) and note-
worthy mergers and acquisitions among the top 100 defense industrial firms.
Five of the transactions involved companies that are both listed in the top
Table 2.1 Stability of revenue rankings for large U.S. defense firms
(Defense News Top 100 List 2018)
Company 2018 rank 2009 2000
Lockheed-Martin 1 1 1
Raytheon 2 6 3
Northrop-Grumman 4 4 4
Boeing 5 3 2
General Dynamics 6 5 5
United Technologies 11 10 10




The United States and its defense industries 11
100 firms. Other mergers, such as Boeing’s effort to acquire KLX, have sig-
nificant transaction values.
The large-scale transactions are not limited to large defense industry players.
The merger of Trans Digm and Esterline, for example, detailed in Table 2.2, does
not involve any major defense industry players. Both are active, however, in the
defense market and the transaction value is certainly significant at $4 billion.
In addition to the large size and value of the mergers, the rapid pace of
multiple mergers and acquisition activity involving the same companies
defines this period. Rockwell Collins, for example, acquired B/E Aerospace
in 2017 and then United Technologies acquired Rockwell Collins the
following year. It may well be that the era of no large defense industrial mer-
gers is over—at least for a while. So, while Big-Five mergers are still off
limits, other consolidations are apparently now in play.
Table 2.2 Some recent and noteworthy defense industrial mergers and acquisitions activity
Firms (with Defense























Acquisition Undisclosed Complete 2018 Erwin 2018
Boeing (5) & KLX Acquisition $3.2B Announced 2018 Eakin 2018
General Dynamics (6)
& CSRA (39)8
Acquisition $7B Completed 2018 Fuller 2017




Harris (19) & Exelis Acquisition $4.6B Completed 2015 Heilman
2015
Northrop-Grumman (4)
& Orbital ATK (30)




Rockwell Collins (41) &
B/E Aerospace
Acquisition $6B Completed 2017 Rockwell
Collins 2017









Acquisition $23B Approved 2018 Bartz 2018
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Boeing mergers and acquisition activity since 1993: an illustrative example
Between 1993 and 2017, Boeing made 69 acquisitions with most being
relatively small. According to Defense News (2018), however, six were
valued at more than $1 billion. In then-year dollars, the largest was
McDonnell-Douglas in 1996 for over $13 billion, followed by Rockwell
International Aerospace in 1996 for $3.8 billion. After the 1998 Lockheed-
Martin, Northrop-Grumman merger disapproval, Boeing’s larger-scale acqui-
sitions were somewhat curtailed. In 2000, Boeing acquired Hughes Elec-
tronics Satellite for $2.1 billion and Jeppesen Sanderson for $3.1 billion.
Boeing later acquired Aviali Inc. in 2006 for $2.1 billion, and Vought’s
South Carolina Facility in 2009 for $1 billion. Boeing’s commercial divi-
sions motivated some acquisitions such as the Vought facility; while the
defense business primarily motivated others, such as McDonnell-Douglas
(IMMA 2018). Many benefited both divisions.
More recent Boeing activity includes two rather large transactions,
Embraer, a joint commercial venture, and KLX, an acquisition (see Table
2.2). However, Boeing’s recent merger and acquisition activity generally con-
sists of relatively small firms offering competencies deemed useful in Boeing’s
overall business.
Diversification of defense industrial firms
In the 1990s, conventional wisdom held that large defense firms would
include more commercial business in their portfolio and the defense base
would become more integrated into the industrial base. In particular, Lock-
heed-Martin would have only 25 percent of its revenue from defense by
2010 (Wayne 1998a). Lockheed-Martin’s defense sales percentage of revenue,
however, increased from 64 percent in 1998 to 93 percent in 2010 (Defense
News Top 100, 2018).
If the defense industrial base was becoming more integrated into the gen-
eral economy, then one would expect that concentration ratios9 would
decrease in the 21st century. Two serious studies of defense market concen-
tration ratios indicate otherwise—one for the U.S. (Greenfield and Brady
2008) and one with an international focus (Dunne and Smith 2016). Green-
field and Brady (2008) consider the U.S., with a concentration ratio data
from 1958–2006. Over the period 1990–2006, the top 100 concentration
ratio has not changed very much (as the dotted trend line indicates). Dunne
and Smith (2016) report similar results.
Source selections
With the main acquisition bureaucracies increasingly focused on the adminis-
trative process (Laird 2018), and the need for fielding new capabilities more
quickly, the services will likely use special (but not temporary) methods to
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answer the need for speed. Some have operated for a long time, such as the
U.S. Air Force’s Big Safari (1952). Others are relatively new such as the U.S.
Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, a U.S. Army counterpart, and the U.S.
Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD’s) Strategic Capabilities Office.
Needing to respond effectively to serious military threats, but doing it on
the cheap, DoD is much less likely to press the technical envelope in new
systems. Accordingly, industry can expect more emphasis on Lowest Price
Technically Acceptable (LPTA) selection criteria. Among other things, this
has involved fixed-cost development contracts and an associated transfer of
risk from DoD to the winning bidder.
This was DoD’s basic approach to the KC-X selection in 2011, which,
among other things, meant greater risk borne by the winning team,
Boeing. It is also DoD’s approach in its more recent selections such as
MQ-25 UAS, T-X trainer aircraft, and the replacement ICBM support
helicopter (Insinna 2018b; Kendall 2018; Sanders 2018). LPTA source
selections also seem to be more resistant to protests, which can signifi-
cantly delay acquisition programs.
With industry bearing greater risks, only large, diversified, and solvent
defense companies can afford to be primes for major acquisition programs.
Boeing, for example, has lost $3.5 billion (and counting) on the KC-46 (Boe-
ing’s version of the KC-X) development contract (Insinna 2018b). Boeing,
however, is sufficiently large and profitable that it can take such events in its





















Figure 2.3 U.S. top 100 concentration ratio 1990–2006 (adapted from Greenfield and Brady
2008, esp. Figure 2.4 on p. 56).
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46 overrun, and Boeing states that such events have no major effect on cur-
rent financial management (Reuters 2018).
Boeing is taking similar risks with its recent victories (MQ-25, T-X and
UH-1 replacement) for many reasons. First, being both a civil and military
company is deeply embedded in Boeing’s corporate ethos. Second, its cur-
rent leadership believes being in both markets has major advantages for
increasing profitability and mitigating uncertainty (Thompson 2018).
Third, it can use its lucrative commercial airliner business to cushion
defense market risks in defense markets (and conversely). Finally, Boeing
accepts significant short-term losses as good long-term investments, the
returns being future business opportunities (Cameron 2018). At present,
Boeing appears to be an early adapter to this apparently emerging defense
market era. Other firms, however, have taken notice and apparently
intend to change their corporate strategies accordingly (e.g., Lockheed-
Martin; Warner 2018a). As a result, one can expect that the already-
formidable barriers to entry into the U.S. markets will only increase. It is
worth noting that major European airframe companies, Leonardo and
Saab, were partners in successful 2018 Boeing proposals and were not pri-
mary players. This will likely continue under the Budget Control Act;
major-programs with long-term, high-value, winner-take-all source selec-
tions will likely reinforce this tendency.
The U.S. government as a sovereign monopsonist
The U.S. government is essentially the only customer, a sovereign monopso-
nist, for U.S. defense firms and sales to other customers generally require its
consent. Greenfield and Brady (2008, 63–66) nicely summarize the microeco-
nomics of this situation. At the same time, the defense marketplace in the
United States is subject to sovereign rules made through various legislation
and regulations. The U.S. DoD defines what products are to be sold—
through a requirements process and the government pays for product
development.
Even though the government is a monopsonist, rule-maker, and product
developer, its reign is not absolute.
First, the government is not a unitary whole. It consists of separate and
sometimes contentious parts inherent in its separation-of-powers structure.
Franck and Udis (2017), for example, concluded that the government some-
times functions more like a “quarrelsome committee” than the monopsonist
in standard economic theory. This helps explain DoD’s source selection
attempts for the KC-X aerial tanker. At times, the rival bidders, Boeing and
Airbus Group, exploited the committee’s quarrels, which appeared to grant
them veto power over the process (Franck, Lewis and Udis 2008, esp. 2, 36).
Second, there has been a long-term decrease in the number of first tier
contractors. The consolidations called for in the 1993 “Last Supper” have
facilitated this shift. A contemporary observer noted the following, “Power
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has shifted from the Defense Department to the defense contractors. The
Pentagon has less leverage when there are fewer places to go” (Wayne
1998a).
Third, after program source selection, the power relations, referred to as
“fundamental transformation” in Transaction Cost Economics literature (e.g.,
Williamson 1996), change significantly. The winning firm becomes the sole
supplier of the product in question for products such as the F-35 and has
something of a monopoly position. This results in bilateral monopoly consist-
ent with the model summarized in Greenfield and Brady (2008, 66). The
annual bargaining ritual between DoD and Lockheed Martin for F-35 prices
serves as an example. As a sovereign monopsonist, however, DoD can dictate
a price, as in Production Lot 9 (Clark 2016).
A fourth limit to government power is bid protests, which are intended to
provide self-interested enforcement of competitive norms through challenges
to procurement decisions. Bid protests, or the possibility, can increase defense
firms’ bargaining power relative to DoD.
Employment in defense industries
Estimating defense industry employment is difficult, if not impossible.
Researchers making inquiries into defense employment and particularly those
making international comparisons are likely to encounter a number of serious
data issues. Most importantly, there is no clear and unambiguous standard
definition of what constitutes defense industrial employment. The primary
definition, for example, is those working in end-item producers. A secondary
definition is suppliers to primary producers, with tertiary being “induced”
employment. Hartley (2017, 32) notes varying definitions across nations as to
whether it includes suppliers of end-item producers in employment estimates
(33) or lower tiers of the supply chain (some are unaware of the connections
with a defense firm) (30). Hartley (2017) also comments on the differing U.S.
defense industrial employment estimates ranging from a low of 800,000 to
a high of 3,500,000 (33). In this section, we consider recent estimates from
the Aeronautical Industries Association (AIA), and Deloitte, a global consult-
ing company actively involved in the defense sector.
AIA developed a methodology with IHS Markit, using some proprietary
information; data came from sources such as the Census Bureau, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, and from the American Association for the Advancement of
Science. Table 2.3 depicts the AIA results.
Using Bureau of Labor Statistics data in addition to various corporate
reports, Deloitte estimates direct employment for specified North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. The next step is to estimate
connections with other codes using the Bureau of Economic Analysis’
Regional Input-Output Modeling System (2018). It is unclear how much
non-defense employment, however, this particular method captures. Even
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though Deloitte makes a serious effort to do just that, it is questionable
whether they obtain precise estimates.
While both AIA and Deloitte methodologies are credible, they involve
methods and data not fully disclosed. It, therefore, seems likely that these esti-
mates are impossible to replicate and verify. Furthermore, the reported results
vary significantly, which likely results from the variance in the underlying
methods.
Domestic and international operating environment
The industrial and regulatory policies of the Federal Government are key to
understanding U.S. defense industrial affairs.
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Defense industrial policy meets practice in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR), jointly published by the General Services Administration (GSA),
DoD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Its
stated purpose is “use by executive agencies in acquiring goods and services”
(GSA 2018). Further guidance includes the Procedures, Guidance and Infor-
mation (PGI); the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS); and the services, Army (AFAR), Navy (NFAR), and Air Force,
supplements the FAR (GSA 2018).
The entire FAR system seems intended to comprehensively prescribe per-
missible actions in the federal purchase of goods and services, to include cir-
cumstances in which deviations are authorized. The length and complexity of
the FAR has resulted in difficulties dealing with commercial firms in the gen-
eral economy. The summary report of a federal forum on managing the
defense supplier base observed, “the challenge of operating in accordance
with complex federal acquisition regulations discourage small and innovative
businesses from partnering with the government,” particularly in sectors such
as bio technology (GAO 2006, 7).
Another effect seems to encourage defense acquisition through FAR
“workarounds.” Initiatives have included the Air Force Rapid Capabilities
Table 2.3 Estimates of defense industry employment (AIA 2018, esp. 1; Deloitte 2016,














(2016) 355 488 843 1,587 2,430
Deloitte
(2014) 845 331 1,233 2,909 4,141
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Office, DoD’s Strategic Capabilities Office (Franck, Hildebrandt and Udis
2016), and using Other Transactional Authorities (OTA). Existing legisla-
tion authorizes these for some contracts and provides “the opportunity to
craft procurement arrangements specifically targeted to novel ideas and
technologies, without having to shoehorn the process into the complex
and often arcane world of traditional government contracting” (Radthorne
2008).
Bid protests
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 is the legislative founda-
tion for the DoD’s bid protest system. The stated purpose of bid protests is to
lessen the risk of fraud or error in federal government procurement and to
increase competition. In addition, bid protests provide a decentralized network
of self-interested overseers to ensure that the procurement process operates
consistently with competitive norms and allows losing bidders to protest—thus
encouraging prospective vendors to compete for defense business (Melese
2018, 669).
There are some reasons to believe the protest system works reasonably
well. A recent RAND study (Arena et al. 2018, esp. xvii–xviii) reported that
protests have the following characteristics:
• they are generally viewed favorably by contractors and unfavorably by
government officials;
• they are relatively uncommon, but increasing in recent years;
• they are unlikely to be filed without having merit;
• they have a declining appeals rate if unsuccessful.
The Report recommended some adjustments to the current system, such as
emphasizing the quality of debriefings to unsuccessful bidders.
A U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) report on protests filed with
the agency in FY2017 reported that 17 percent of protests were sustained,
generally due to errors or inadequacies in the source selection. GAO also
noted the affected agencies undertook corrective actions on their own for
reasons they did not report to GAO to settle a significant fraction of protests
(GAO 2018, 1–2).
KC-X: an illustrative example
With two mature contenders, Boeing and Northrup Grumman, the U.S.
Air Force could have concluded the KC-X source selection quickly and
cleanly. Instead, it was a prolonged process starting in 2001 when the first
tanker recapitalization initiative, an effort to lease 100 tanker versions of
the Boeing 767, began. The U.S. Air Force subsequently awarded a leasing
contract for 100 KC-46s in May 2003. The program was subsequently
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suspended, however, due to misconduct by a major U.S. Air Force official
(Cahlink 2004).
The Air Force restarted the KC-X selection process in 2007 with teams
from Boeing and Northrup Grumman-EADS (NG-EADS) submitting pro-
posals. On February 29, 2008, the Air Force awarded the contract to the
NG- EADS KC-45 entry. Boeing protested the contract award on March 11,
and the GAO ruled in favor of the Boeing protest on June 18, citing Air
Force failure to follow its own selection rules.
Finally, in 2009, the Air Force released a draft Request for Proposals (RfP) with
a fixed-price development contract for 179 aircraft with an emphasis on cost (Air
Force Materiel Command 2009) and simplified criteria intended to preclude pro-
tests. Among many other things, this episode indicates that contract award protests
can have a major delaying effect. (Boeing’s KC-46 was finally selected in 2011.)
Other considerations in bid protests
Bid protests have disadvantages. Protests and their resolution can extract trans-
action costs associated with stop-work orders and delays in programs. Stra-
tegic bidders can threaten a protest, with the intent of influencing the
competition itself or extracting some advantages from risk-averse or hurried
program managers. Melese (2018, 670) called this practice “fedmail.”
To avoid the risks of bid protests, program managers have included protest
proofing approaches in the bid process. One approach is to simplify the selec-
tion criteria, perhaps to something like Lowest Price Technically Acceptable
(LPTA), which is relatively easy to defend against a protest. The Air Force struc-
tured the final KC-X source selection (in 2011), for example, according to
a variation of LPTA, as Figure 2.4 illustrates below. The first phase was an assess-
ment base on 372 pass/fail tests. Bidders needed to pass all of them for technical
acceptability. The next step involved Total Proposed Price (TPP) modified with
analyses of operational effectiveness, life-cycle fuel expense, and associated con-
struction costs, which lead to a total evaluated price (TEP). If the TEPs were
very close (within 1 percent), then the Air Force used a tie-breaker, a scoring of
nice-to-have features (Franck, Lewis and Udis 2008).
This resulted in a labor-intensive evaluation process requiring complete
and careful documentation of all (372x2) passes competitors needed to be
technically acceptable. As Under Secretary of Defense Lynn put it, “We
think we’ve established a clear, a transparent and an open process. We think
we’ve executed on that, and that will not yield grounds for protest” (OASD-
[PA] 2011). This approach may well become a major DoD template.
Another possible form of protest-proofing is stating specifications which
only one potential bidder can meet. In the case of the Presidential Helicopter
program, the Air Force apparently ruled out the airframe that won the ori-
ginal competition in its revised specifications, and received only one bid in
the second round.
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All things considered, a mixed picture emerges; Schwartz and Manuel
(2015) characterize the major issues very well.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
A number of countries, including the United States, are concerned about the
national security implications of foreign investment in their economies. Accord-
ingly, they have systems in place to monitor, and possibly forbid, foreign invest-
ment with significant national security risks (Masters and McBride 2018).
In 1975, the federal government instituted the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The Committee, charged with vet-
ting foreign firms’ investments with national security interest, operates to
implement provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) (Treas-
ury 2018a).
Over time, the CFIUS mission has become increasingly demanding and
complicated and the U.S. Government’s concerns grew that the overall per-
formance system was insufficient (CFR 2018, 2). Accordingly, the U.S. Gov-
ernment tightened the CFIUS regulatory regime. In 1988, the Exon-Florio
Amendment to the DPA “authoriz(ed) the President to suspend or prohibit
foreign acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers of U.S. companies when there is
credible evidence that a foreign controlling interest might threaten national
security.”
In 2007, the Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA)
provided additional legislative guidance to the CFIUS. Among other things,
FINSA adds members to the Committee and mandates increased senior-level
ADJUSTMENTS TO TPP
IF NOT, ELIMINATED FROM
FURTHER CONSIDERATION
TIE BREAKER




TOTAL PROPOSED PRICE (TPP)
MEETS ALL 372 “MANDATORY”
REQUIREMENTS?
“NON-MANDATORY” REQUIREMENTS
SCORE (95 items in 5 groups)
AWARD TO LOWER TEP IF
DIFFERENCE IS ≥ 1%
Figure 2.4 Overview of the (2011) KC-X source selection criteria adapted from a 2010
DoD briefing.
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participation and accountability (Treasury 2018b). In 2018, the United States
enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act motivated,
at least in part, by fears of the People’s Republic of China’s “weaponized
investment” (Masters and McBride 2018). While it is too early to gauge the
effect of the modernized regime, CFIUS has rejected several investments
under FINSA such as the $1.2 billion proposal in early 2018 between
MoneyGram of Dallas, Texas and Ant FinancialMoney a Chinese company
(Yoon-Hendricks 2018).
Export controls: the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
Two examples illustrate impacts of U.S. export controls. First, a French view:
“We are at the mercy of the Americans. Is that satisfactory? No. But we
don’t have any choice” (Florence Parly, French Minister of
Defense). Second, a U.K. view: “I would encourage U.K. industry to design
around the U.S. International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and
produce ITAR-free items.” (James Arbuthnot, Chairman of the UK House
of Parliament Select Defense Committee).
As noted in the introduction, the United States is a major exporter of
defense goods and services. Military sales, however, can have consequences
beyond the transaction itself. Accordingly, the U.S. Government considers
a variety of national security and other policy goals in controlling military
exports (DDTC 2018). The legislative foundations for the export control
regime include the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 and the
Export Administration Act (AEA) of 1979. While the U.S. Government
authorizes three federal departments, State, Commerce, and Treasury, to issue
export licenses, Defense, Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Commu-
nity are also involved in operating the controls system. The State Depart-
ment’s ITAR and the Department of Commerce’s Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) contain the rules for administering the export control
regime.
The U.S. Government applies the ITAR system, basically, to “U.S. persons”
who wish to sell munitions or other goods and services with national security
implications to “non-US persons.” All economic entities in the United States
which deal in goods and services with national security implications, including
technical data, as defined by the U.S. Munitions list must register with the Dir-
ectorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC 2018). Any U.S. entity wishing to
sell such goods and services to a non-U.S. entity must obtain export authoriza-
tions—which include restrictions on retransfer and re-exports and continue no
matter how many times sellers transfer the item. Retransfer authorizations are
generally as time-consuming as the original authorization with violations result-
ing in major criminal or civil penalties. In addition, security concerns result in
export restrictions for selling to countries that use a lot of non-nationals in
their military, such as Qatar, UAE, and Oman.
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Assessing the export control regime
The system of export control itself has a number of benefits. However, they
consist mostly of bad outcomes avoided and are difficult to enumerate, much
less quantify. There is some anecdotal information. The United States pre-
vented Venezuela’s export of F-16 fighter aircraft to Iran, a U.S. adversary
(AP 2006). It also prevented sales of air transports to Venezuela in that
same year.
For the private sector participants, the direct costs of export controls
include processing authorization requests. Boeing, for example, had about
100 fulltime employees dealing with ITAR matters in the commercial Boeing
787 program (Gates 2006a).
Some costs associated with the export control system are also difficult to
quantify. They include worsened relations with longstanding military allies
like the United Kingdom and France as noted in the quotes above. Perhaps
the most serious costs are distortions in behavior of both customers and pro-
ducers. U.S. allies report that they are seriously considering reducing military
relations, equipment purchases, and joint production with the United States
in order to avoid the ITAR regime (Altmeyer 2018). Boeing resorted to
some rather exotic and expensive measures to lessen 787 model exposure to
ITAR (Gates 2006b).
Reform of the export control regime
“At some point people need to lift their eyes from their military concerns
and look around at how the global market has changed” (Loren Thomp-
son, quoted in Gates 2006a). For some time, some U.S. Government
agencies, such as GAO, expressed dissatisfaction with the export control
regime (2007 September). In August 2009, during the first term of the
Obama Administration, the President directed a comprehensive review of
the program. The review concluded that the current system was seriously,
if not comprehensively, broken. The overarching recommendation was to
refocus the effort to better protect really critical technologies, the “crown
jewels” (White House 2010). The recommendations, with President
Obama’s approval, also focused on moving to a single control list, a single
primary enforcement agency, a single licensing agency, and a single IT
system.
Implementation measures included two executive orders (White House
2010, 2013). The legislation needed to fully implement the reforms, however,
had, as of 2018, not yet appeared on the Congressional agenda. The Trump
Administration has continued export reform, albeit with different policy pri-
orities. A new Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy was introduced
(per NSPM-10, April 19, 2018). The practical effects have included
a significant increase in approved requests for Foreign Military Sales (Mehta
2018a).10
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The United States is the leading arms exporting nation and is also a major
arms importer (17th, by SIPRI TIV metrics).11 It is, however, difficult for
foreign defense firms to enter the U.S. market. EADS’ attempt to become
a major supplier to DoD serves as an illuatrative example.12 EADS was
a diversified and profitable enterprise, with a robust portfolio of defense busi-
ness, and a successful line of commercial air transports. In the first decade of
this century, it had substantial resources (in many dimensions) to effect an
entry to the U.S. defense market.13
EADS entered the 21st century with a mixed assessment of future profit-
ability. While the Airbus division was a leading supplier of commercial air-
liners, European governments’sharing development risks was under increasing
pressure. The airline market was also cyclical and not consistently profitable.
A Five Forces (Porter 1980) assessment of the threats to EADS profits around
2003 would look something like Table 2.4.
EADS set out to increase its defense business by targeting the U.S. market.
There were, however, significant barriers to entry. First were well-established
U.S. incumbents with market knowledge, military technology, and political
connections. Second was a strong Buy-American sentiment. Finally, U.S.-
French relations were less than cordial at the time. There was, however,
room for more firms in the market following the U.S. consolidations in the
1990s. Boeing, for example, was the only domestic source for a replacement
U.S. Air Force aerial tanker (KC-X) with EADS as the most credible
alternative.
To exploit the KC-X opportunity, and others, EADS made serious efforts
to resemble a U.S. firm. It built, or acquired, production facilities within
U.S. borders. It chose at least some locations to influence Congressional
sentiment. EADS hired executives with local knowledge. It also partnered
with Northrop-Grumman (NG)—a major aerospace firm with associated
market knowledge and customer connections. The NG-EADS public rela-
tions campaign portrayed its KC-X proposal as an American system with




Internal Rivalry Moderateto High
Excess capacity at low part of commercial cycle; less
diversified than Boeing
Entry Threat Low Economies of scale; political relationships.
Substitutes &
Complements Low
Few substitutes for large air transports; many
complements.
Supplier Power Low Many suppliers; few buyers
Buyer Power VariesWidely
Buyers drive hard bargains at low points in airliner
sales,..
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substantial U.S. content. In short, EADS chose to protect its profitability by
diversifying into the U.S. defense market. Taken within the context of the
Five Forces model, this can be construed as seeking a new, less risky
market niche (Porter 1980, esp. Chapter 16). EADS’ entry prospects at the
time are summarized in Table 2.5.
EADS’ well-conceived entry strategy did not quite succeed. The NG-
EADS team won the first KC-X source selection in 2008, but Boeing suc-
cessfully protested that result, and won the repeated competition in 2011.
Currently, Airbus Group (formerly EADS) has only limited sales to the DoD.
BAE is the only non-U.S. firm currently among DoD’s largest suppliers,
ranking 9th (Ausink 2018).
Future trends in the defense industry
DoD is facing multiple challenges in the future including changes in the
security and financial environment, the need to accelerate technological
innovation, and changes in the defense industrial environment and rising unit
costs in real terms. The U.S. position as sole superpower will grow more
tenuous as it has decidedly limited resources with which to deal with emer-
ging peers (e.g., USNI Proceedings October Cover 2018) such as China and
Russia.
DoD will face serious budget pressures in the 2020s and beyond, driven by
competing needs for readiness, modernization, and force size, plus growth of
entitlements. In 2028, the U.S. Government expects that entitlement outlays
will account for about 15 percent of GDP and that interest on Federal debt
will be at three percent. Discretionary expenditures would then be about
six percent of GDP, about half of which they estimate for defense (Congres-
sional Budget Office [CBO] 2018, esp. 66, 84).
In addition, spending by DoD on services contracts, ranging from clerical
and administrative work to vehicle maintenance to research and development,
Table 2.5 Assessment of EADS’ entry prospects in the U.S. defense market, early 2000s
Market characteristics EADSsituation Comments
Own Economies of Scale Favorable Large, established defense supplier.




Testy US-French relations; strong
Buy-American sentiment.
Access to distribution channels, raw




operability issues with US systems.
Marketing advantages for incumbents Highlyunfavorable
US firms’ much better access to the
government.
Expected retaliation Favorable Well-protected in Europe.
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amounted to just under $200 billion in 2011, more than 50 percent of total
DoD contract spending and nearly a third of the entire DoD budget. From
2000 to 2011, DoD services contract spending increased at an average annual
growth rate of 7.2 percent and DoD expects growth to continue changing
the nature of defense industries the DoD uses. This could potentially curtail
the funding available for modernization. Finally, defense firms increasingly
depend on global financial markets, which act according to returns on invest-
ment, not on national security.
DoD provides financing for contracts through prompt payment of invoices
and through a mechanism known as progress payments where firms invoice on
work done before the product is delivered. Section 831 of the 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act encourages DoD to use performance payments
when compensating defense firms. As a result, and as part of a broader set of
changes to the acquisition rules and to increase accountability, the Undersecre-
tary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment hopes to change how com-
panies receive their cash flow based on performance measurements among
other things (Mehta 2018b). Complicating this initiative is that DoD incentives
do not currently reflect tradeoffs of schedule, engineering, cost, and perform-
ance and do not consistently reward companies who control costs.
The U.S. Third Offset Strategy emphasizes developing asymmetric advan-
tages by harnessing disruptive technologies and operational innovations to
capitalize on strengths and exploit weaknesses. The innovations include
hypersonic systems, deep augmented reality, quantum computing, learning
systems, behavioral learning, human machine collaboration and combat team-
ing, network enabled cyber systems, big data, and biological sciences, such as
biosensors, growing custom organisms, and bio inspired engineering.14
As an outreach to the tech community and to encourage the development of
disruptive technologies, the Pentagon undertook several initiatives, such as creat-
ing an outpost in Silicon Valley, the Defense Innovative Unit-Experimental
(DIU-X),15 charged with accelerating commercial innovation for defense and
subsequently replicated in both Boston and Austin; the Defense Digital Service,
which allowed technologists into the Pentagon; and the Defense Innovation
Board consisting of technology leaders providing independent advice and recom-
mendations on innovative means to address future challenges.
While DoD officials are promoting closer ties to and encouraging cooper-
ation with high tech companies and acquiring goods and services from
a national as opposed to a defense industrial base (Wayne 1998a), there are
some disincentives that may hinder this ambitious agenda. These include
financial factors, such as a limitation on profit margins. As an example, Apple
and Google generated margins of around 30 percent in 2014 while Lockheed
Martin’s profit margins for the F-35 fighter have not yet reached double
digits. Another factor involves safeguarding intellectual property with policy
trends diluting safeguards for companies’ ownership of their intellectual prop-
erty. In addition, managing the overwhelming regulatory burden and vagran-
cies of the political system may be off-putting for companies (Thompson
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2015). While some companies such as Microsoft and Amazon have declared
their willingness to sell technology to and cooperate with DoD, others such
as Google have refused due to strong internal staff opposition steaming from
moral objections to weaponizing their work (Sanger 2018; Shane, Metz and
Wakabayashi 2018). Finally, as technology development continues to be
more international, the U.S. export control regime needs to adjust to and
recognize the global origin of innovation and the foreign ownership of firms
(Berteau 2011).
There are no easy solutions to the future challenges facing the U.S. defense
industry, but most importantly, the U.S. DoD can undertake some initiatives to
better manage the uncertainty and send clear demand signals to industry. Primar-
ily, the United States needs a better articulation of national security strategy and
national military strategy with clearly defined courses of action. This will permit
better prioritization of budget and force structure needs and guide reductions
including managing the inherent tensions between readiness and modernization.
If there is a focus on readiness, then in the case of budget reductions and as mod-
ernization programs are cut, all is not lost. DoD needs to ascertain which elem-
ents of the industrial base are most vulnerable and find a better way of
supporting the base and including that information in budget decisions.
The matter of industrial base vulnerabilities and risks has the US Govern-
ment’s attention (e.g., DoD 2018; GAO 2018; White House 2018b). Key
areas of concern include workforce qualifications (human capital), overall
decline of the US industrial base, government procurement practices, and
policies of defense industrial competitors (especially China). The extent to
which these problems can be ameliorated remains to be seen. Among other
things, there needs to be a clear articulation of ends so that the technological
means have a purpose and are no longer technology for technology’s sake.
Notes
1 Defense News, a news organization focused on global defense news (www.defense
news.com/), defines defense revenue as sales that support military, intelligence,
and homeland security. Defense News has multiple sources for the revenue data:
companies submit the data; data gleaned from analyst communities; contract data
from defense ministries such as the case of Japan.
2 The top 10 defense companies on the Defense News list are the same as the top 10
on the SIPRI list. There are, however, some differences in ranking. These are
driven by (a) Boeing’s forming a “global services” division which includes some
activities previously identified with defense work, and (b) technical issues with
Almaz-Antey (Russia)—including ruble-dollar conversions and less detailed
reporting of defense work.
3 See Tables 6.1 and 6.2. DOD Procurement outlays have risen pretty much in
keeping with the Reagan and “other contingencies” increases, the procurement
holiday of the 1990s, the post-2001 increases (with an interesting spike in 2008
corresponding to the “surge” in Iraq), and then downturn in procurement corres-
ponding to the Budget Control Act of 2011.
4 The dinner became known as the “Last Supper.”
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5 For acquisitions, the first firm listed in the left column is acquiring
the second firm.
6 Transaction values vary somewhat, depending on source and date. This could
reflect the status of ongoing negotiations, but the open literature is not clear on
this issue.
7 According to available reports, the joint venture involves Embraer’s commercial
operations. Those same reports, however, indicate the emerging strategic alliance
will likely include manufacture and marketing of the Embraer KC-390 (a military
transport-tanker).
8 All top 100 companies are identified with their 2018 Defense News ranking.
9 Investopedia (2018) calculates the concentration ratio as the sum of the market
share percentage held by the largest specified number of firms in an industry. In
this case, we consider the concentration ratio of the top 100 firms (measured in
percentage of total defense purchases)
10 Other factors may also be involved, such as increases in international tensions in
the MidEast and Pacific Rim.
11 SIPRI’s primary unit of measurement is TIV (trend indicator value) in lieu of
direct financial value. See www.sipri.org/databases/milex for further explanation.
12 EADS became “Airbus Group” in 2014. This discussion is a much-abridged ver-
sion from Franck, Lewis and Udis (2008, 106–114) with updates.
13 In 2002, EADS was ranked 7th in revenue among defense firms, due mostly due
to its market position in Europe (Defens News, Top 100).
14 This list is a compilation of predictions from various sources to include the popu-
lar press (e.g., Burnett 2018).
15 Based on private discussions there is some criticism leveled at DIU-X including
its choice of locating in defense space making access difficult for companies and
creating an environment that is not conducive to the exchange of ideas. DIU-X
has gone through several distinct phases in its growth. It was initially staffed by
defense acquisition staff with minimal expertise in a startup environment that
needs to promote interactions with startups and innovative companies. DIU-X
then went through a period when it recommended that startups must partner
with major defense contractors to do business with DoD instead of facilitating
direct interactions. Performance metrics were then set up for DIU-X that may
nudged DIU-X contacts with industry in the wrong direction. These include
measuring the number of engagements set up between DoD and startups and the
money spent by DIU-X.
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